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A B S T R A C T
Why do some countries enact more ambitious climate change policies than others? Macro level economic and
political structures, such as the economic weight of fossil fuel industries, play an important role in shaping these
policies. So do the national science community and the national culture of science. But the process by which such
macro-structural factors translate into political power and national climate change policies can be analyzed
through focussing on meso level policy networks. The Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks (COMPON)
research project has studied climate change policy networks in twenty countries since 2007. Along with some
findings, this paper presents some methodological challenges faced and the solutions developed in the course of
the project. After a presentation of the project, we first outline some practical challenges related to conducting
cross-national network surveys and solutions to overcome them, and present the solutions adopted during the
project. We then turn to challenges related to causal explanation of the national policy differences, and propose
Qualitative Comparative Analysis as one solution for combining different levels of analysis (macro and meso)
and different data types (quantitative, network and qualitative).
1. Introduction: why study climate change policy networks?
Why have some countries adopted much more ambitious policies to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions than others? The United Nations has
strived to create global norms to reduce emissions, but we know sur-
prisingly little about why countries vary so widely in their adherence to
these norms. To take just one example of somewhat puzzling national
differences, Finland and Sweden have very similar natural environ-
ments, standards of living and political systems, but differ greatly in
their climate change policies. Sweden’s emissions are less than half of
Finland’s and are trending downwards. Finland is barely living up to its
emission reduction commitments to the EU, Sweden has set its own
legally binding target to be carbon neutral by 2045 ([1]). What explains
these differences?
Different theoretical perspectives offer different answers to this
question. Political economists have argued that the economic structures
of a country, such as the economic (and, consequently, political) weight
of fossil fuel industries, are the primary determinants of its environ-
mental policy [2]. Political scientists emphasize the impact of macro-
political polity structures such as degree of democratization [3]. Realist
international relations scholars have argued that states only follow
global environmental norms to the extent that it is in their national self-
interest [4]. Institutionalists argue that the capacity of the national
scientific community to certify the validity of anthropogenic climate
change, plus the receptivity of the national culture to scientific findings,
also help account for the variation in national responses [5].
While all these perspectives obviously have something to contribute
to an explanation of the national variation in climate change policy, we
argue that each of them also has its drawbacks, which all have to do
with focussing on the macro level of analysis. The political economy
perspective tends to give excessive weight to economic explanations
and assume direct macro-macro causation without much attention to
social mechanisms at play at the meso-level. The standard political
science perspective is similarly focussed on macro structures. The rea-
list explanation generalizes the idea of self-interested individuals to the
macro level. Institutionalist and cultural explanations also focus on
national generalizations. To complement the picture, we argue that the
study of meso-level policy networks can provide evidence on which of
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these theories is more accurate, or how they combine, in producing
national responses. In addition, the pattern of policy-making networks
at the meso level may be as important as economic or political factors at
the macro level in explaining climate policy outcomes. These can be
studied using methods of network analysis.1
It may well be true that countries whose economies are more de-
pendent on fossil fuels tend to be less ambitious in their climate change
policies than others. While such macro explanations are obviously im-
portant, they say nothing about the mechanisms through which the
economic weight of the fossil fuel industries results in weak policy
outcomes. Consequently, and perhaps even more importantly, they say
very little about the prospects of change – other than that a macro level
transformation of the entire system is necessary in order to reduce
emissions. Research focussing on meso-level policy networks instead
sheds light on what organizations exert influence on policymaking,
what beliefs they carry, what kind of coalitions these organizations
form to push for their agenda, how they are connected to state orga-
nizations and how their opponents are organized [6,7]. Identifying
these actor constellations makes it possible to assess the prospects of
change towards less carbon intensive economic structures.
To give an example, our quantitative analysis of the structure of
climate change policy networks in Finland found a strong advocacy
coalition consisting of energy intensive industries, trade unions and
state organizations, all of which tend to prioritize economic growth
over ecological concerns, and a weaker opposing coalition pushing for
more ambitious climate change policy [8]. We then conducted further
qualitative interviews with key organizations in the network, focussing
the questions on potential tensions within the current coalitions (such
as rifts between high and low carbon industry organizations) and with
emerging new alliances (such as some trade unions joining forces with
environmental NGOs) that could lead to transformations in power re-
lations within the network and eventually lead to policy change.
Another example of how macro-level analyses can be complemented
by studying meso-level policy networks is our recent study comparing
Finnish and Swedish climate policy [1]. A focus on macro-level in-
stitutions would classify both countries as corporatist. Corporatist
countries have often found to be ambitious in their environmental po-
licies due to their consensualism and inclusive nature [9]. However,
climate policy in Sweden is much more ambitious than in Finland. By
focusing on meso-level policy networks, we show that in Sweden the
climate change policy network is more consensual and more inclusive,
whereas in Finland collective bargaining organizations (business peak
organizations and trade unions) play a strong role at the expense of
environmental NGOs. Thus, even though both countries are corporatist
at the macro-level, one factor explaining the differences in their policies
are the differences in their meso-level policy networks. Such differences
would remain invisible without policy network analysis.
Within the wider research field of sustainability transitions, in-
cluding energy transitions, the advantage of the policy network per-
spective is that it directs attention to politics and policymaking. As [59]
argue, transition studies have often focussed on the technological or
institutional levels, paying relatively little attention to the fact that
changes in policies and politics are essential preconditions of most
socio-technical transitions (see also Meadowcroft [10]). Coalitions of
political actors (such as NGOs, governmental agencies, private busi-
nesses) can play a major role overcoming resistance to energy regime
changes [11]. Policy network analysis maps the actors and their
relations in a policy subsystem and is therefore a good complement to
the studies of socio-technical transitions, where the role of actors and
politics has been to some extent neglected.
Analyzing policy networks can, thus, add an important contribution
to comparative studies in the fields of sustainability transitions and
climate change politics. One of the challenges of such comparative re-
search is that collecting data on policy networks is labor intensive.
While macro indicators related to national differences in policy change
readily available from sources such as the World Bank, data on meso-
level policy networks needs to be collected through means such as
surveys. Moreover, selecting the organizations to survey and later
analyzing the data greatly benefits from knowledge of each national
political context. International research funding schemes that would
fund such an effort in a medium N sample of 10+ countries are rare.
One way of overcoming these difficulties, faced by many scholars
engaged in the comparative study of energy transitions and climate
change, are informal research networks. The idea is that scholars agree
on a joint research agenda, establish national teams and apply for
funding from national science funders. This paper reflects on the ex-
periences of one such network, COMPON (Comparing Climate Change
Policy Networks). Our aim is to outline what we have learned in terms
of methodological challenges and solutions, for the benefit of those who
wish to engage in similar studies in the field of energy and climate
change research in the future (or who are interested in joining the
COMPON effort).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly present the
COMPON project and its achievements to date, focussing on the
methodological and organizational challenges and lessons learned. In
Section 3, we discuss the practical challenges of conducting cross-na-
tional network surveys, including network boundary specification,
collecting survey data, selecting the sample and measuring the depen-
dent variable – climate change policy performance. In Section 4, we
discuss the challenges related to explaining differences in policy per-
formance, and propose Qualitative Comparative Analysis as one pos-
sible solution. In conclusion, we sum up what we have learned so far,
and propose directions future research.
2. The COMPON project and its accomplishments to date
The COMPON project was initiated in 2007 by Jeffrey Broadbent
and collaborators. Theoretically and methodologically, the project
builds on the pioneering work by Knoke et al. [12] on cross-national
comparison of policy networks (see Broadbent [5] for the history of
development of this approach). Over time, the project has grown to
include teams working on twenty countries, mostly located in North
America, Europe, and East Asia [13]. The country selection varies from
world leaders in ambitious climate policy to the laggards. It includes
different world regions and levels of economic development, major
emitters as well as minor players, and different polity types from the
most pluralist to the most corporatist, as characterized by Lijphart [14].
Medium-N research designs like this one are best suited for analyzing
meso-level mechanisms, such as those related to policy networks. This
is because they allow for relatively detailed tracing of policy processes
and mechanisms within the country cases, as well as generalization
based on cross-case comparisons (see Ragin [15]). The design thus goes
beyond single case studies that present important findings but do not
allow for much generalization. At the same time, the design is a de-
parture from large-N quantitative studies, which are good at cross-case
generalization, but pay limited attention to within-case dynamics.
For most cases, the first phase of the project was the media discourse
network analysis, which has resulted in most of the published output of
COMPON to date. Each case focused on national newspaper outlets,
representing a range of more liberal, conservative and economic or-
ientations. While traditional newspaper readership has been declining
for many years, largely due to the increasing use and popularity of
social media, large “legacy” news outlets continue to serve as important
1 “Macro” level phenomena generally refer to phenomena at large scales, such as the
societal level. Often this is contrast with the micro level, which are phenomena at the
individual or small group level. Meso level is an intervening level, and refers to things like
organizational and interorganizational processes. One argument we make is that macro
level patterns are sometimes a consequence of decisions and actions by meso-level actors.
In the energy sector this might include phenomena such as framing energy issues, cam-
paigns about particular energy policies, or pressure put on governments through inter-
organizational meetings and forums, and lobbying.
T. Ylä-Anttila et al. Energy Research & Social Science xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
2
spaces for key actors to engage with each other in publicly visible policy
debate. These legacy outlets are also important as agenda-setting media
that provide content for social media news consumption [16,17]. Sev-
eral complementary layers of media analysis were carried out. First,
teams looked at changes in the news share of climate change news
stories over the period 1997–2010. News share refers to the percentage
of all stories published that focus on climate change. Second, a frame
analysis approach was used to code climate change stories for the
period 2007–2008. This was a peak period of coverage in most cases,
which was driven by the constellation of the buzz around the Al Gore
movie, An Inconvenient Truth, the release of the fourth IPCC Assessment
Report, by the Nobel Prize awarded to the IPCC and Al Gore and by
preparations for the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC conference (COP 15).
Content was coded to thematic frames. Coding also focused on the scale
of the news narrative, or whether the story primarily concerned climate
change debate at the international, national, or subnational level.
Third, a more detailed Discourse Network Analysis was carried out for
the same peak period. Discourse Network Analysis connects news
sources (individuals and organizations) to discursive themes in order to
highlight how different actors align with each other through shared
agreement or disagreement with key climate change discourses [18,19].
Fourth, and finally, some teams incorporated a layer of more inductive
qualitative analysis using NVIVO qualitative analysis software in order
to take a closer look at particular issues of interest they wished to ex-
amine in greater depth.
A significant body of work has been published that focuses on the
media frame analysis or discourse network analysis. This includes single
case studies of Greece [20], Portugal [21]; Mexico [22], Germany [23],
Canada [24–27], Ireland [28] and South Korea [29] and the United
States [30]. This body of work also includes a multi-case comparison on
the US, Canada, India and Brazil [58] and another one focused on Asian
COMPON cases, including China, India, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan. This analysis shows how UN membership enhances the news
share and importance given to the issue of climate change in various
societies across Asia, and identifies the unique trajectory of China,
which largely ignored the issue until the early 2000s, but where climate
change has attained very high media visibility in recent years [31].
A recent article by Broadbent et al. [13] is worth considering in
greater depth, as it draws together several key findings from the cross-
national comparative analysis of media discourse frames. This article
also represents a large-team collaborative effort at co-authoring and
sharing results from across the case studies. In terms of news share, the
COMPON cases tend to follow similar trajectories with an overall trend
of increasing media visibility from 1997 to 2010, punctuated by peaks
driven primarily by global political events, such as the launch of IPCC
reports or Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings. Overall, media
discourse does not easily or simply align with whether a county is a
high-emitter or strong performer in terms of climate change mitigation.
Rather, the global field of COMPON cases is marked by a complex set of
tensions that include the degree to which news discourse reflects the
scientific consensus that climate change is real, human-caused and re-
quires political action, and the geographical and political scale of cli-
mate change impacts. In general, countries that have managed to re-
duce their emissions are those where newspaper frames support
mitigation policies, accept climate science and are orientated to the
global level of climate politics and ecological risks.
The policy network data collection and analysis was the second
phase of the COMPON project. The core data for the policy analysis
consists of surveys of the 50–100 most influential organizations in the
climate change policy domain of each country (for details on the pro-
cess of selecting these influential organizations to be surveyed see
subsection “collecting survey data” below). The questionnaire focuses
on inter-organizational networks of collaboration and information
flows (including connections to international institutions), as well as
beliefs on climate change, including acceptance of the UN-set norms for
emission reduction.
As many teams are still working on policy network analysis, much
less has been published on this dimension of COMPON, nor has there
yet been a large-scale collaborative analysis of the global field com-
parable to the media analysis carried out by Broadbent et al. [13]. Still,
several studies looking at the policy networks in single countries have
been published. In South Korea, Yun et al. [32] find a binary political
alignment with a weaker environmental coalition and a stronger
growth coalition. In the US, Jasny et al. [33] find that the clustering of
communication networks among politicians and scientists creates an
“echo chamber” effect that reinforces political polarization, con-
tributing policy paralysis at the national level. In Finland, Gronow and
Ylä-Anttila [8] find a strong coalition of businesses, governmental or-
ganizations, trade unions and political parties that prioritizes economic
over ecological values, and has considerable influence on national cli-
mate policy.
While COMPON provides an ambitious and productive framework
for cross-national comparative research, the scope of the project has
also presented unique organizational challenges. Project funding has
varied by case, with some teams working through a large NSF grant
from the United States, obtained by Broadbent and Fisher, and others
working from funding secured in their own countries. Due to the pro-
cesses and uncertainties involved in grant applications, this has meant
that data collection has started at different times for different cases, and
with varying degrees of research support. This means that from its in-
ception COMPON has been characterized by: 1) an ambitious geo-
graphical and methodological scope that has necessitated methodolo-
gical exploration, reflexivity, and social learning across teams over the
ten-year lifespan of the project; and 2) challenges of moving data col-
lection and analysis forward across many teams working with varying
timelines and research resources.
These organizational challenges were addressed through ongoing
work on research design across periodic research meetings, often held
in conjunction with conferences where members of multiple teams were
present. In addition, multi-day research workshops have been held
periodically at various teams’ home universities. Individual team
members have also done extended research visits at other teams’ home
institutions. Earlier in the project these periods of intensive collabora-
tion led to developing common protocols for the different layers of
media analysis and a common core set of policy network survey ques-
tions that could be implemented by all teams. This ensured compar-
ability across teams, while also allowing individual teams the flexibility
to localize their work on the project by adding additional survey
questions, levels of media analysis, or forms of data collection de-
pending on their national context and available resources. This also
included developing shared strategies for sampling and constructing
media databases, as well as sampling frames for the policy network
survey. As the data collection progressed, these intensive workshops
and meetings also included drafting shared protocols to address needs
for collaborative data storage and sharing, ensuring adherence to
sometimes differing research ethics and confidentiality requirements
for participants in different societies, and reaching a common under-
standing for issues like co-authorship. As more teams completed their
media and policy network analyses, these intensive periods of in-person
collaboration turned to focus on issues like collaborative data cleaning
and reviewing data coding to ensure comparability for cross-case ana-
lysis. The data cleaning was done in a manner that maximizes the
amount of retained data, i.e. when some country teams had added some
questions to our common core survey, the data on those questions from
that country was kept in the file that combines data from all countries.
This choice resulted in a slightly more complicated dataset structure but
kept as much data as possible.
Over a period of a decade, these periods of intensive discussion,
supplemented by virtual meetings via Skype, have become vital sites for
collaborative research design and analysis that has helped address
many of the organizational challenges of the project. However, some of
the other challenges have been more intractable. This is particularly the
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case for the varying timelines of the policy network surveys for the
different cases, as policy network actors work within climate change
policy fields that are evolving and being shaped by key national events,
such as elections and changes of government, as well as international
events, such as the release of new IPCC reports, debates and decisions at
various Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings. The issue of differing
timelines remains a limitation of the informal research network ap-
proach that needs to be considered in interpreting and publishing our
results.
3. Practical problems of conducting cross-national network
surveys and some solutions
3.1. Network boundary specification
We now turn to practical problems faced in designing and im-
plementing network surveys in several countries. We begin with a
problem common to all social network analysis, the boundary specifi-
cation problem [34]. This problem has to do with where the boundaries
of the network should be set and it comes down to answering the
question: what is the population that one is interested in? This decision
essentially determines the size and composition of the sample. In policy
network analysis, the goal is usually mapping a whole network – “the
set of ties among all pairs of nodes in a given set” ([35], p. 26). It is the
constellation of the relations of these actors that is presumed to have an
effect on policy. The boundary of the network essentially determines
the population under study. The whole network in our case consists of
the climate policy subsystem in each case country. When data is col-
lected by surveys, the final dataset will not, obviously, include this
entire population due to some members of it not answering the survey.
We address the consequences of this fact below in the subsection on
response rates.
But which actors are part of this subsystem? This decision de-
termines the boundary of the network [35]. It is common to identify
two different approaches in social network analysis for making this
decision. In the realist option, the people or organizations under study
are allowed to decide for themselves whether they identify with a
certain group (which is then analysed as a network). The realist ap-
proach has the downside that certain actors, perhaps for strategic rea-
sons, can deny being part of a policy subsystem, even if we have some
theoretical criteria which says that they should be included. Thus, it can
then be difficult to decide who to listen to in these cases. The other
option is the nominalist approach which lets the researcher decide on
the inclusion of actors based on pre-existing theoretical criteria2. We
used a combination of the nominalist and the realist approach. In policy
network analysis, a general criterion for whom to include in the net-
work is to target those actors that have a stake or interest in having an
effect on the policy conducted within this particular field of policy [36].
These are typically organizational actors, such as governmental minis-
tries, NGO’s, business enterprises, and research institutes. We identified
these actors in several ways, including nominations by a panel of ex-
perts, mentions in printed sources (newspaper articles, organizational
charts, trade magazines) and research publications [12]. In the inter-
view stage, interviewees were presented with the resultant roster of
organizational names but they could also name additional organiza-
tions.
3.2. Collecting the survey data
We present the Finnish survey as an example of how the network
boundary specification was done.3 To select the organizations to be
surveyed, we relied on a combination of literature reviews, expert as-
sessment and media analysis. First, a preliminary list of respondents,
representatives of national organizations with a stake in climate change
policy in Finland, was compiled based on previous research and
knowledge of Finnish climate change policy. The list was then pre-
sented to four experts representing different types of organizations.
Some changes were made following the suggestions of these experts.
Furthermore, in order to make sure that our list did not preclude any
important actors, we cross-checked our list with the help of computer-
assisted analysis of media data on climate change. The media data
consisted of 729 newspaper articles on climate change published be-
tween 1997 and 2013 in Helsingin Sanomat, Finland’s most widely
circulated newspaper. The algorithm listed all proper nouns in this
media data and we used it to check whether we had missed any im-
portant organizations that had a say in the media. A comparison of our
list organizations with this computer-generated list did not lead to any
new changes. Using the type of three-step process described above,
combining previous research, experts and media reporting, is advisable
because it will likely result in a list that includes the most important
actors. These are the actors that policy network analysis is usually in-
terested in; marginal actors that do not show up in any of these steps are
not likely to have strong effects on policy [37]. A disadvantage of this
strategy focussing on the most influential actors is that in cases where
actors in the margins of policy networks or newly emerging actors do
manage to have influence on policy, these effects may be missed. A
strategy we used to mitigate this risk was to complement the organi-
zation roster in the survey form with an open list where respondents
could add names of organizations we had not included.
Our final list included 96 organizations. This list determined the
organizations listed in our questionnaire for the network-related ques-
tions. This type of fixed list, or roster, is usually used when one has a
sense of the boundaries of the network [38]. All the COMPON surveys
had at least three network-related questions and some country teams
added extra network-questions. The three core questions asked the re-
spondent to check off from the list organizations that the respondent
organization: 1) collaborates with on a long-term basis, 2) thinks of as
influential in the climate change policy-making process, and 3) gets
scientific information from in relation to climate change policy.
The nodes in our analysis were organizations, but ultimately an
individual has to act as the respondent for each organization. The in-
dividual respondents that we targeted were either in charge of climate-
related issues or environmental policy in general. The survey asked
these people to represent the policies and views, or “institutional
thinking” ([39], p. 550), of their organization rather than reporting
their personal views. This is a standard procedure in policy network
research when questionnaires are used for obtaining data [36].
3.3. Response rates
All survey research faces the problem of response rates. There is an
additional problem that answering network surveys can be tedious
because the respondent has to answer each network question in relation
to all the nodes listed in the roster. We tried to maximize the response
rate by making the questionnaire relatively short and easy to follow.
Three network questions were included and they were presented side
by side in the questionnaire with a roster of 96 organizations. A re-
search assistant contacted respondents first by phone and then sent a
link to an online survey. When necessary, this was followed up by
several emails and phone calls.
The response rate was 83% in Finland and as high as 88% in South
2 In addition to realist and nominalist approaches, there is also the snowball method. In
this case, the researcher has a pre-existing idea on whom to include in the network but
these initial respondents are asked to name additional people (or organizations) that they
think are a part of this group. The downside of the snowball method is that if the initial
starting point is somehow biased, it will probably show in the end result (see [38]).
3 One can of course use other methods besides surveys for collecting policy network
data, for example, pre-existing archival data or interviews. In what follows we discuss
gathering data with a questionnaire.
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Korea [32]. However, the same approach was applied in the Swedish
case and the response rate was only 70%. In the context of ordinary
surveys, all of these rates would be considered high, but the issue of
missing data is more pressing for network research because certain
nodes may be crucial to the operation of the political subsystem. It is
very difficult or even impossible to impute missing network data. A
possible solution could be to check whether, for example, governmental
organizations have links to certain kinds of organizations on average
and then decide on this basis that such links will be imputed for gov-
ernmental organizations with missing responses.
However, there is no way of making sure that these sorts of im-
putations are justified (the ties that governmental organizations have
might vary). For this reason it is preferable to maximize response rates
by sticking to the essential questions and shortening the questionnaire
as much as possible. However, if all else fails and one ends up with a
low response rate, it is still possible to analyse the ego networks of those
respondents that are well represented in the data. It is common, for
example that representatives of NGO’s are over-represented as re-
spondents, especially compared to business organizations. In such a
case, analysing the ego networks of NGO’s will still yield results, even
though the whole-network perspective is lost.
There are at least two checks that one can use to assess whether and
to what extent the obtained survey responses create a bias in re-
presentation of the subsystem. First, it is a good idea to count response
rates per organizational sector and compare these rates with each other.
If, say, 90% of NGO’s took the survey but only 10% of business orga-
nizations participated, this has to be borne in mind while conducting
analysis and reporting results. Second, if the questionnaire includes a
question about the actors that are seen as influential by respondents (as
ours did), one can check how many of the most influential organiza-
tions are missing from the sample.
Our survey data was collected by national teams of the COMPON
research network in each country. These teams obtained their own
national funding which has mainly been sufficient for collecting data
and producing national case papers. National research funding orga-
nizations usually operate at the national level and often seek novel
topics and encourage new data collection. This practice makes it diffi-
cult to fund a national case that fits into a broad international com-
parison that employs data already collected in other countries. There
are growing calls for social research to move beyond “methodological
nationalism” towards more cosmopolitan forms of analysis [40].
However, our experience suggests that current structures of research
funding and support create practical challenges to moving beyond
methodological nationalism.
A practical lesson that we have learned is that even if funding ori-
ginates in several national sources, it is a good idea to have some people
to be officially in charge of coordinating the whole endeavour. In ad-
dition, it can be more challenging to collect policy network survey data
in some countries than in others – not just for reasons having to do with
funding but for practical reasons as well. In India, for example, due to
the nature of administrative institutions and cultural assumptions
concerning how the administration should operate, obtaining access
into governmental ministries proved to be more difficult than in our
other case countries.
3.4. Defining the dependent variable
One important challenge for a study that aims to explain differences
in the ambitiousness of climate change policy between countries is
defining the dependent variable: what exactly constitutes ambitious
climate change policy? Our choice for this purpose is the Germanwatch
climate change performance index. In the following, we discuss the
reasons for this choice, as well as some of its drawbacks and alter-
natives.
Initially, we considered simply using a measure GHG emissions or
emission trends as a measure of climate change policy performance. We
quickly learned, however, that while this may be adequate for some
studies, there are several reasons not to settle for this solution. First,
today’s emission levels are a result of long path dependent processes
and policy decisions that may have been made for reasons other than
the desire to protect the environment. For example, France’s low per
capita emissions are at least as much the result of building much nu-
clear power in the 1960’s for reasons other than environmental, as they
are a result of climate change policy choices made in the last two
decades. Recent emission trends would likely be a better option – but
they too have been shaped by factors other than climate policies.
Furthermore, some policies may take a long time to have effects, and
current emissions trends may not yet reflect the ambitious policy path
chosen by some countries.
Thus, we are left with the choice between indices combining in-
formation on current emissions, emission trends and current policy
output. To our knowledge, three such indices exist: The Germanwatch
Climate Change Performance Index [41], the Climate Change Co-
operation Index [42], and the Index of Climate Policy Activity [43].
Of these, we chose the Germanwatch index because it is the most
readily available, published online every year with little time lag, and
available for a period of about a decade. The index combines in-
formation on climate policy, emission levels, and emission trends [44].
This index, however, has two drawbacks. First, it combines information
on different aspects of the phenomenon, some of which are based on the
subjective evaluations of experts in each country. A change in the value
of the index in a particular country can reflect changes in any one of
these component parts and the value or its change does not reveal
which part has changed. This information is available online, but in-
corporating it does make comparison of countries slightly more com-
plicated. Second, the index is not motivated only by scientific interests.
Rather, the Germanwatch NGO aims at pushing countries towards more
ambitious policies, which is pursued through media coverage of the
annual index publication. This use of the index could result in countries
being upgraded or downgraded dramatically from one year to another,
especially in response to policy events that have received widespread
public attention during the past year. To prevent these year-to-year
fluctuations in the index placement from having too much effect on
research results we decided to use, for most analyses, the five-year
average of the index as a dependent variable to smooth out short term
fluctuation.
Two alternative indices are the Climate Change Cooperation index
and the Index of Climate Policy Activity. The Climate Change
Cooperation (CCC) Index developed by Bernauer and Böhmelt [42] is
an attempt to assess the climate policy performance of countries by
combining measures of policy output and outcome (emission levels).
Unlike the Climate Change Performance Index, it measures climate
policy developments based on objective factors, such as ratification of
treaties, and covers as many as 172 countries. One of the main reasons
we use the Germanwatch index instead of the CCC is that the latter only
covers the time period from 1996 to 2008 and thus does not reflect the
latest developments in climate policy.
The Index of Climate Policy Activity focusses only on policy output.
It measures policy density and intensity [43]. These concepts refer to
the number of policy instruments and the content of these instruments.
Density is often measured by simply counting different policies put in
place related to a certain topic (such as climate change). However, mere
density does not account for the content of the policies and therefore
the Index of Climate Policy Activity also measure the intensity of po-
licies by focusing on the resources that are invested in specific policy
instruments. A simple reason for using the Germanwatch index instead
of the CPA is that the latter is not yet publicly available. The authors of
the index have informed us that publication of the raw data will take
place in 2018, which opens up the possibility to redo some analyses
using this new index as the dependent variable.
Finally, for some analyses, it is possible to repeat them using several
of the dependent variables described above, and focus on those results
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that are the most robust regardless of the way in which climate change
policy performance is measured. This is the approach taken by
Broadbent et al. [13], who look at the relationship between media
framing of climate change and three outcome variables using Qualita-
tive Comparative Analysis (see below for more details).
4. Challenges of causal explanation of policy outcomes and some
solutions
Once the challenges concerning data collection and definition of the
dependent variable have been overcome, we are faced with the chal-
lenge of causal explanation of the country-level outcomes. One obvious
solution is to use publicly available datasets on country-level variables
and conduct multiple regression analyses. Such macro-structural re-
search is obviously necessary, but does not capture the whole picture of
the forces that shape national climate change policies. While macro-
structural work shines in its ability to produce generalizable knowledge
from cross-case comparisons, its ability to unpack the within-case dy-
namics leading to outcomes is limited. The inevitably limited number of
cases when country differences are analysed – there are, after all, less
than 200 countries in the world and not all relevant data is available for
all of them – has led some scholars to go as far as to question the
usefulness of regression analysis in such studies and call for the use of
simpler “low-tech” approaches such as basic tabulations or clustering
techniques (see Shalev [45] and other contributions to the same sym-
posium).
Another obvious approach would be to stick to case studies such as
those we have described above and aim at theoretical generalizations.
Limited comparisons of two to four countries in a more traditional
comparative politics vein, which selects cases using established ap-
proaches such as the method of difference and method of similarity
[46], would enhance the ability of such an approach to produce gen-
eralizable knowledge.
A third solution is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) [15,47].
QCA is a medium-N approach aiming at cross-case generalization
through set theoretical thinking that retains attention to within-case
dynamics. As we have argued above, it is fruitful to see climate change
policy outcomes resulting from the combined effects of macro-struc-
tural characteristics of societies and meso-level policy network struc-
tures. While some of these can be measured in numeric terms, others
may be more qualitative conditions of country cases. The advantage of
QCA in such situations is that it allows for an “integrative research
design for which various kinds of qualitative and quantitative data
sources can be used” ([48], p. 49). Numeric scales, as well as qualitative
assessments of various aspects of a country case can be converted to
fuzzy set membership scores for QCA. QCA then takes a set-theoretical
approach to causal inference, looking at the configuration of conditions
that lead to a given outcome [15]. In the studies discussed here, the
interest lies in configurations that lead to the outcome “a country enacts
ambitious climate change policy”, as well as configurations that lead to
the opposing outcome.
The outcome variable can be derived from the Germanwatch
Climate Change Performance Index (see above). The explanatory vari-
ables (or causal conditions in QCA terminology) are of two types. The
first type are properties of the meso-level policy networks in each
country, such as the centrality and influence of international organi-
zations in the national network, the degree of clustering of the network
into competing advocacy coalitions, or the relative influence and re-
sources of pro-environment and pro-economy coalitions. The second
type are macro-level variables such as measures of the share of fossil
fuel industries and energy intensive industries in each national
economy, and national public opinion on climate change. Calibrating
these into fuzzy set values for QCA involves considerable interpretative
work, comparing the cases to assess the degree to which each causal
condition is present or absent in each case. Set-theoretical inference is
then carried out and truth tables presented, showing which
combinations of conditions are sufficient for the outcome we are in-
terested in ([49], p. 17).
To date the COMPON project has published one QCA analysis ([13],
p. 11). This analysis used newspaper framings as its comparative causal
conditions (or independent variables) and used four indicators to es-
tablish an outcome condition representing intentional policy-driven
mitigation–reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. The newspaper
framings were accepting science, attention to global ecological impacts,
concern with international negotiations, and support for mitigation
policies. Positive values on these four frames were hypothesized to be
associated with more successful mitigation outcomes. To assess the
mitigation outcome, we used four variables: Kyoto Protocol emissions
reduction percent, actual percent emissions change from 1990 to the
2008–12 commitment period, percent difference from target (either
exceeding or not meeting), and percent attainment of Kyoto Protocol
considering emissions credits (created by funding emissions reductions
projects in other countries). Over the 17 country cases included, we
were able to find a rough trend of correspondence between number of
positives on the causal conditions and the emissions reductions.
5. Conclusions: what have we learned
The scope and ambition of the COMPON project, with twenty teams
working towards a comparative analysis of climate change policy net-
works and the related global field of media discourse, has necessitated
an exploratory approach to collaborative, multi-case data collection
and analysis. This has included large scale research design issues, such
as constructing common research questions and strategies for data
collection and analysis. It has also included a broad range of technical
issues including comparability of response rates, which survey ques-
tions have been most salient in different social contexts, and main-
taining data comparability while translating research instruments to
use in different countries. This has been an emergent process involving
ongoing negotiation and social learning from the network of re-
searchers who have contributed to the project. As COMPON reaches its
10-year anniversary, it is an ideal time to engage in methodological
reflexivity so that others attempting to embark on similar ambitious
initiatives might learn from our process.
At least three productive lines of inquiry could be explored as the
COMPON project continues. First, the “global field” constituted by our
twenty case studies is very much incomplete and imbalanced, with
representation of cases from Europe, East Asia, and North America, but
with limited representation from Africa, Latin America, the Middle
East, or Southeast Asia. This has partly been the result of the largely ad
hoc evolution of COMPON through our research networks and the ca-
pacities and interests of the domestic social science research estab-
lishments, and partly due to which cases have been supported through
research funding. While extending COMPON to new case creates chal-
lenges of synthesizing data collected at different points in time, it would
be valuable to continue to add new cases to obtain a more complex and
holistic understanding of the global field of climate politics. Second,
social science research on climate change has typically focused on ei-
ther the media sphere or the political sphere. There are few examples of
analysis of climate politics that adopt a relational approach to synthe-
sizing media discourse analysis and policy network analysis ([50]).
COMPON teams have data which would allow this research gap to be
addressed and thereby provide significant insight into the social pro-
cesses whereby visibility, influence, and power flow back and forth
between media discourse networks and policy networks. Third, the
analysis produced by the COMPON project captures a particular period
in the history of climate change policy debate. For many of our case
study societies, the social context has shifted in recent years through
transitions to new governments with substantially different orientations
to the global climate policy regime or the scientific consensus. Fur-
thermore, recent developments such as the Paris COP climate change
agreement, the release of the Fifth IPCC Assessment Report, or the
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election of Donald Trump in the United States have ripple effects on
societies throughout the global field. Future work could also be directed
at extending our analysis longitudinally through additional rounds of
media and policy network data collection and analysis. Moreover, the
use of longitudinal data would allow us to dig much deeper into pro-
cesses of network formation, distinguishing between social selection
and social influence. We would be able to assess, for example, whether
organizations choose to collaborate with like-minded or resourceful
organizations (social selection) or whether, say, central organizations in
the network are able to influence the opinions of others (social influ-
ence). This ongoing program of work has significant policy relevance.
Increasingly, international scientific bodies like the IPCC are re-
cognizing that the outstanding issues related to climate change are not
only technological or scientific, but are largely political and cultural. As
such, results from this cross-national comparative research program can
feed into IPCC analyses of the social dimensions of climate change. The
COMPON approach aligns well with a post-Paris Accord focus on the
value of ongoing research that monitors and finds ways to help im-
plement national goals for climate change mitigation.
Finally, COMPON provides a valuable methodological model for
social science research on energy more broadly. The social scientific
issues associated with climate change and energy are related, as energy
production and consumption are intimately bound up with climate
change and its potential solutions [51]. Like climate change, addressing
the negative social and ecological impacts of energy systems does not
only require technological fields of expertise and solutions, but im-
pinges on political, social, and economic spheres [52–55]. Energy
transitions are partly determined by political coalitions [11]. Further-
more, the issues and potential solutions related to climate change and
energy systems routinely spill out beyond national borders into inter-
national spheres of political debate. As such, we need to think crea-
tively about new forms of cross-national or cross-societal analyses that
can inform future policy making and action related to energy and cli-
mate change. However, there are challenges to undertaking such cross-
societal research, as research funding is typically allocated at the na-
tional level and single-country case studies are generally easier to carry
out. Through our overview of the methodological problems and solu-
tions that have arisen in implementing COMPON, we contribute a
methodological framework for cross-national comparative analyses that
attends to both the cultural sphere (media discourse networks) and
political sphere (policy networks). This framework may be adapted to
look at energy systems, such as the persistence of fossil fuel-dominated
economies (oil and gas, coal), or the pace and scale of renewable energy
transitions across different societies. Just as climate policy responses
vary internationally, there are also varying movements towards re-
newable energy transitions and de-carbonization, or resistance and re-
trenchment into fossil fuel-based economies. A similar approach to the
COMPON model would be applicable for better understanding the in-
terplay of the cultural and political dimensions of energy policy and the
transformation of energy systems across different societies.
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